
3 6.3 hypothetical questions that do not relate with precision all of a claimant's impairments cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the Secretary's decision." (quotation omitted)). The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments nevertheless, an order and judgment m ay be cited un der the terms and condit ions of 10t h Cir. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir.1993)("Testimony elicited byĮffective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. Cruse, 49 F.3d at 619 (quotation omitted). First of all, when mental impairments diminish a claimant's residual functional capacity, our cases generally require the production of "expert vocational testimony or other similar evidence to establish the existence of jobs in the national economy" to satisfy the Secretary's burden at step five. 6 The ALJ erred both procedurally and substantively. Instead, the ALJ simply concluded that restricting plaintiff to unskilled work (necessitated by her scant work history in any event) sufficed to account for her cognitive and emotional impairments. 5 Notwiths tanding t hese findin gs, the ALJ did not inc lude any men tal limitat ions in his hypothetical inquiry to the vocational expert at plaintiff's hearing. Consistent with the findings set out in the ALJ's decision, these intermediate ratings reflect limitations sufficiently severe to interfere with work activities but not disabling enough to dictate a peremptory award of benefits under the listings at step three. II at 111, 113- 14, 140, 142-43, 162, 217-18, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's affective and personalit y disorders resulted in "Moderate" fu nctional l imitation s with resp ect to "Activities of Daily Living" and "Maintaining Social Functioning," and "Often" caused "Deficiencies of Concentration, Persistence or Pace Resulting in Failure to Complete Tasks in a Timely Manner." R. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 49 F.3d 614, 617 (10th Cir.1995), the ALJ completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form evaluating plaintiff's mental impairments. 4 Pursuant to mandated procedure, see generally Cruse v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir.1994)(reciting standard of judicial review for Secretary's factual and legal determinations). While substantial evidence supports the ALJ's treatment of plaintiff's physical impairments, the ALJ erred in equating plaintiff's mental limi tations wi th absent w ork skill s, thus neces sitating reversal. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir.1988)(generally describing Secretary's five-step analysis). Relying on a vocational expert's identification of work satisfying these criteria, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled at step five of the Secretary's evaluative procedure. The ALJ acknowledged the former by restricting plaintiff to light and sedentary work he purported to account for the latter by further limiting the range of potential jobs to those designated as unskilled. Accompanied by obesity, and mental, including depression and personality disorder.
